

Contents

Acknowledgement	i
Contents	iii
References	ix
List of Tables	xxi
List of Figures	xxii
Abbreviations	xxiii
Appendices	xxv
Appendix I	xxv
Appendix II	xxxii
Appendix III	xlvi
Published Research Papers	lv
Abstract	1
Chapter 1 Introduction	3
1.1 Key Terminology	5
1.1.1 insurgency versus terrorism.	5
1.1.2 Peace Accord	6
1.1.3 Comprehensive Peace Accords	7
1.2 State Response to Insurgency	7
1.3 Background: Insurgency in Assam	8
1.3.1 ULFA and the Assam Agitation.	9
1.3.1.1. ULFA’s political theory.	10
1.3.2 ethnic insurgencies in Assam.	12
<i>1.3.2.1 Bodo insurgency.</i>	12
<i>1.3.2.2 Karbi insurgency.</i>	15
<i>1.3.2.2.1 insurgency breaks.</i>	16

1.3.2.3 <i>Dimasa insurgency</i> .	17
1.4 Insurgency and its Sustenance: Root Causes	19
1.4.2 ethnic diversity.	22
1.4.3 identity question.	22
1.5 Signing of Peace Agreements	23
1.5.1 Nine-point Agreement or the Naga-Akbar Hydari Accord, 1947.	23
1.5.2 Sixteen-Point Agreement 1960.	23
1.5.3 Shillong Accord 1975.	24
1.5.4 Mizo Accord 1986.	24
1.5.6 Memorandum of Settlement with the Tripura National Volunteers, 1988.	25
1.5.7 Memorandum of Settlement with All Tripura Tiger Force, 1993.	25
1.5.8 Bodo Memorandum of Settlement 1993.	25
1.5.9 MoS establishing a Bodoland Territorial Council, 2003.	25
1.5.10 MoS with United People's Democratic Solidarity, 2011.	26
1.5.11 Memorandum of Settlement with Dima Haram Daogah, 2012.	26
1.5.12 MoU with UPPK	26
1.5.13 Agreed Text of Settlement with ANVC.	26
1.4.14 Framework Agreement with NSCN(IM).	27
1.5 Objectives of the Study	27
1.6 Research Questions	27
1.7 Scope of the Research	28
1.8 Delimitation	28
1.9 Limitations	28

1.10 Methodology	29
1.11 Research Design	30
1.12 Structure of the Study	31
1.12.1 Chapter 1: Introduction.	31
1.12.2 Chapter 2: Review of Literature.	31
1.12.3 Chapter 3: Materials and Methods	32
1.12.4 Chapter 4: Results	32
1.12.5 Chapter 5: Strategies for Approaches to Peace	32
1.12.6 Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusion	33
Chapter 2 Review of Literature	34
2.1 Introduction	34
2.2 Concepts of Peace	34
2.3 Previous Research on Insurgency in Northeast India	37
2.4 Previous Research on Government of India’s Peace Policy	40
2.5 Research Gap	44
2.6 Looking for Solutions	45
Chapter 3 Materials and Methods	46
3.1 Participants	47
3.1.1. sampling procedures.	48
3.2 Instrumentation / Measures of the Study	49
3.2.1 A Matrix of the Process of Peace Accords and Review of the Issues Involved	50
3.2.2 Case Study 1: Bodo Accord 1993	52
3.2.3 Case Study 2: Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) Accord 2003.	70
3.2.4 Case Study 3: Memorandum of Settlement with UPDS.	100
3.2.5 Case Study 4: Memorandum of Settlement with DHD.	122

3.3 Procedures	141
3.3.1 Research Design.	141
3.3.2 Data Collection Procedures	142
3.4 Data Analysis	142
3.5 Conclusion	150
Chapter 4 Results	152
4.1 Causal Factors	153
4.2 Is there a Peace Policy?	156
4.3 Peace Accords Not an End to Conflict	159
4.4 Separate Dialogues with Factions of Same Group	160
4.5 Separate Agreements for Same Ethnic Group?	162
4.6 Overlapping Interests of Different Groups	163
4.7 ‘Open Door’ Policy and Legitimacy Factor	165
4.8 Delay of Settlement	166
4.9 Time frame in peace process / time bound implementation of accords	167
4.10 A Moratorium on Peace Talks	168
4.11 One Accord Irrespective of Factions	169
4.12 Participation of Civil Society	170
4.13 The Gender Perspective	170
4.14 Development Policies to Address Security Issue	171
4.15 Counterinsurgency and India’s Neighbourhood Policy	172
4.16 Representative Quotient	173
4.17 Need for Institutionalisation	173
4.18 Do the Accords Address the Root Causes?	174
4.19 Revival of Statehood Demand	175
4.20 Demographic Issues	176

4.21 ‘Tribal Homeland’ and Reservations -----	177
4.22 Special Status and Autonomous Councils -----	178
4.23 Agitations and Rebellions Demanding More Power -----	179
4.24 Conclusion: An overall Assessment -----	179
4.25 Few Suggestions -----	181
Chapter 5 Discussion -----	183
5.1 Purpose of the Study -----	183
5.2 Methods and Procedures -----	183
5.3 Major Findings -----	184
5.3.1 Feeling of alienation -----	184
5.3.2 Counterinsurgency: the immediate strategy. -----	184
5.3.2.1 counterinsurgency in Bodo areas. -----	187
5.3.2.2 counterinsurgency in Karbi Anglong and NC Hills. -----	188
5.3.2.3 success of counterinsurgency strategy in Tripura. -----	189
5.2.3.4 analysis. -----	190
5.3.3 the perceived peace policy. -----	191
5.3.3.1 ceasefire. -----	191
5.3.3.2 coercive diplomacy -----	196
5.3.3.3 policy of surrender and rehabilitation. -----	198
5.3.3.4 analysis. -----	199
5.3.4 peace process. -----	201
5.3.4.1 gender perspective in peace process and peace agreements. -----	205
5.3.4.2 dialogue and negotiations. -----	208
5.3.5 Need for Institutionalisation of the Peace Policy -----	213
5.3.5.1 structure of Myanmar Peace Centre -----	215
5.3.6 peace agreements as strategy. -----	215
5.3.6.1 Elections -----	217
5.3.7 development as a strategy. -----	217

5.3.8 structural changes in administration.	221
5.3.9 ethnic autonomy	222
5.3.10 concept of non-territorial autonomy	224
5.4 Suggestions	225
5.5 Conclusion	225
Chapter 6 Summary and Conclusion	227
6.1 Summary of Findings in the light of Research Questions	227
6.2 Implications of the Findings	230
6.3 Significance of the Findings	232
6.4 Limitations	235
6.5 Recommendations for Future Research	235
6.6 Policy Recommendations	236
6.6.1 policy guidelines.	236
6.6.2 structural components of peace-building.	237